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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
its ROAD COlVIlVIISSION, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
Case No. 
COl\IMERCIAL S E C U R I T Y, / 10834 
I~ANK, as Administrator of the 
Estate of GEORGE E. KEN-
DELL, Deceased and IRENE H. 
KENDELL, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEl\ilENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is an eminent domain proceeding instituted 
by the State of Utah, by and through its Road Com-
mission, involving commercial properties owned by 
defendants located at the mouth of 'Veber Canyon in 
the town of Uintah, YVeber County, Utah. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before a jury on September 
8, 1966, with the Honorable John F. \Vahlquist pre-
siding. The jury awarded respondents the sum of $22,-
500.00 for the 2.89 acres actually taken by appellant 
and $37,000.00 for damage to the land remaining after 
the taking, making a total award of $59,500.00. The 
Court entered judgment on the verdict on November 
30, 1966. On September 20, 1966, appellant filed a 
motion for a remittitur or a new trial, in the alterna-
tive, which motion was denied by the Court on October 
13, 1966. Appellant then filed another motion for a 
new trial on October 24, 1966, which was denied by 
the Court on January 26, 1967. Appellant then ap· 
pealed from the judgment of the Court entered or: 
the verdict. 
RELIEF' SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek affirmation of the jury verdict 
and the judgment entered thereon by the Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State of Utah filed eminent domain proceed-
ings in the District Court of Weber County, on June 
24, 1964, naming George Kernlell and Irene H. Ken-
dell as defendants therein (R-1). George Kendell had 
just died on June 17, 1964, and Commercial Security 
Bank, as Administrator of .Mr. Kendell's estate was 
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substituted as a party. ( T-56, R-15). Process was 
served on respondent Irene H. Kendell and respondent 
Commercial Security Bank on June 25, 1964, and an 
order of immediate occupancy was signed by the Court 
on July 6, 1964 ( R-4, R-51). These are the only parties 
iuvolYed in this appeal and the other named respondents 
in appellant's brief are in no way involved. 
The subject property was purchased by the Ken-
dells in 1939 and consisted of a total tract of property 
of 4.51 acres ( T-55 & Exhibit B). Appellant actually 
condemned 4.18 acres consisting of 1.29 acres repre-
senting an existing right of way which appellant had 
through respondents' property and 2.89 acres to be 
taken by appellant for widening the existing highway 
and for an exit ramp (Exhibits B, 2-R). The 2.89 
acres taken consisted mainly of property located on 
the 'vest of Highlvay 89 except for a piece of property 
located east and adjacent to the existing Highway 
89 right of way with approximate dimensions of 105 
feet long by 7 .5 feet in width on the north and 30 feet 
in width on the south (Exhibit B). Respondents were 
then left with a tract of property approximately .33 
of an acre located to the east of the Highway 89 right-
of-way and to the south of Highway 30 where both 
highways intersected prior to the improvements by the 
State . (Exhibits B, 3). For purposes of convenience 
the .33 of an acre not condemned by appellant 
will be ref erred to hereafter as the East property and 
the 2 .89 acres condemned by appellant will be ref erred 
to as the YV est property. 
-·-- - .·J.!1 
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At the time of taking, th eEast property consisted 
of motel cabins to the rear of the property, a service 
station providing gas, oil, lubrication and minor me-
chanical repairs, a grocery store and lunch counter, 
and an antique shop (Exhibit 2-l). 
The \Vest property consisted of a large tract of 
ground with frontage on Highway 89 of 736.3 feet 
and in a triangular shape of considerable depth on the 
south end of the property (Exhibit 3). 
At the time of taking, both the East property 
and the West property were zoned C-2, which allowed 
the Kendells to have a service station, general store 
and other related commercial activities ( T-8-9). 
After the order of immediate occupancy was ob-
tained, appellant proceeded to ban-icade off Highway 
30 east of the subject property and rerouted Highway 
30 to the south of the subject property and installed 
a fence running east and west 1280 feet from the barri-
cade to the southwest corner of the East property 
(Exhibits 3, 2-A, 2-L, 2-M, 2-N). The fence then went 
north and parallel to Highway 89 from the southwest 
corner of the East property 827 feet, or approximately 
300 yards (Exhibits 3.2-F, 2-H, and 2-J). 
The East property, besides having a portion of 
it taken which necessitated removal of one section of 
gas pumps, was now completely fenced in and barri-
caded except for the small access road approximately 
300 yards north of the subject property (Exhibits B, 
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3, T.59-uO). The 'Vest property was, of course, com-
pletely taken by appellant. 
The jury awarded respondents the sum of $22,-
500.00 for the ::?.89 acres actually taken and awarded 
respondents $37,000.00 as damages to the East prop-
erty, making a total verdict of $59,500.00 ( R-29) . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE VERDICT OF THE JURY 'VAS 
'VELL 'VITHIN THE EVIDENCE AND \VAS 
XOT GIVEN UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF 
PASSION OR PREJUDICE. 
The first case cited by appellant is the case of 
Geary v. Cain, u9 Utah 340, 255 P. 416, which involves 
an assault and battery charge on the person of a woman 
where a jury was quite generous in both actual and 
exemplary damages. This case, however, bears very 
little resemblance to the case before the Court. How-
ever, a very important rule of law which is material to 
the case under discussion is discussed at page 419 of 
the opinion as follows: 
"Ordinarily, if there is any substantial evi-
dence to sustain a verdict in an action at law, this 
Court is powerless to set it aside. Such is the 
general rule reiterated and reaffirmed at almost 
every term of the court." 
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The other case cited by appellant is the case of 
Jensen v. Denver & R.G.R. Co., 44 Utah 100, 138 P. 
1185, which involved the death of a 14 year old bov 
while he was walking on defendant's railroad track. 
At page 1192 of the opinion the court lays down the 
following rule setting forth the conditions upon which 
a trial court may vacate a verdict and order a new trial: 
"But, before the court is justified to do that, 
it should clearly be made to appear that the jury 
totally mistook or disregarded the rules of law 
by which the damages were to be regulated, 
or wholly misconceived or disregarded all the 
evidence ,and by so doing committed gross and 
palpable error by rendering a verdict so enor-
mous or outrageous or unjust as to be attribut-
able to neither the charge nor the evidence, but 
only to passion or prejudice. Whether a new 
trial should or should not be granted on this 
ground, of necessity, must largely rest within 
the sound discretion of the trial court." 
It would seem that according to appellant's own 
authorities the judgment of the trial court should be 
affirmed if there is any substantial evidence supporting 
the jury verdict. See also to this effect People v. Swazey, 
6 Utah 93, 21 P. 400; and Stephens Ranch and Live· 
stock Co. v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 48 Utah 528, 
161 P. 459. 
The verdict of the jury was well within the evidence 
as the following testimony will attest. Verna Aaron 
testified that she was working at the store at the time 
of the taking and described the place as "dead" after 
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the fence was installed around the property by appel-
lant ( T-46). She testified that prior to the installation 
of the fence that the Kendell's received business from 
\Vyoming ranchers coming down Weber Canyon, tour-
ists, local customers, and traffic going to and from Salt 
Lake City and Hill Air Force Base ( T-47 -48) . She 
testified that after the fence was installed business con-
sisted mainly of tourists running out of gas and pur-
chasing small amounts of gas which could be handed 
over the fence to them, and also from the construction 
workers who were involved in the construction of the 
new freeway ( T-48-49). When asked the question 
"And do you get any of the business from Hill Field 
traffic or traffic going from Salt Lake to Ogden?" 
she answered, "No, they don't know how to get in" 
( T-49) . She then concluded her testimony by testifying 
that since the installation of the fence it was "just 
like you were in jail, fenced off" ( T-49-50) . 
Earl Kendell testified that he had worked at the 
store and service station for a substantial period of 
time and that the piece of property taken by the State 
east of and adjacent to the Highway 89 right-of-way 
necessitated the removal of one island of gas pumps 
consisting of three individual pumps (T-51, 59, 60). 
Adelbert R. Craven was called as an expert wit-
ness and testified that he had been a licensed engineer 
for the past 45 years and then described Exhibit 3, per-
taining to the improvements made by appellant and 
the exact acreage involved in the taking (T-11-13). 
7 
In concluding his testimony he testified that he had 
been familiar with the property prior to the taking 
and that since the fence was installed he found it very 
difficult to get into the property and on one occasion 
had to go part way up \Veber Canyon and turn around 
and come back in order to get into the property ( T-
12, 15). 
The Uintah City Clerk testified as to the pertinent 
zoning ordinance and testified that both the East and 
\Vest properties were in a C-2 zone, which authorized 
a service st ation, grocery store and similar commercial 
activities ( T-8-9) . There was further testimony to the 
effect that the \Vest property was purchased by the 
Kendell's to be used as commercial property with the 
eventual establishment of a service station and related 
commercial activities thereon ( T-51, 53). 
Mr. G. T. Hone was called as an expert witness 
and testified that he had been in the oil business in 
numerous capacities since 1922, and had been an execu-
tive in the Sinclair Refining Company ( T-20-21). He 
further testified that he either owned or leased 30 serY-
ice stations in the Ogden area at the time of his appear-
ance in court ( T-21). He testified that he had been 
acquainted with the Kendell's since 1935 and had de-
livered gas and petroleum products to them since that 
time ( T-22-23). He testified that the highest and best 
use of the East property was a service station and 
store site, which was the use they were presently being 
put to, and that at the time of the taking the market 
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rnlue of the East property was from $60,000.00 to 
$70,000.00 ( T-24-25). He testified that he was familiar 
with the improvements that had been made by appellant 
and that because of these the market value of the East 
property after the taking was nominal ( T-25-26). In 
response to a question concerning the value of the East 
property after the taking, :Nlr. Hone testified as follows 
(T-26): 
"A. From our standpoint it wouldn't be worth 
anything because we couldn't keep an operator 
in it as far as operating a service station is con-
cerned. There isn't enough business there. Now, 
.Mr. Kendell's daughter has been operating the 
place and the gasoline business has gone down 
to practically nothing there. 
"Q. As an owner of service stations and as a 
rentor and lessor of service stations, would you 
have this property as a service station site your-
self? 
"A. No, I wouldn't buy it. I wouldn't want to 
buy it for anything. 
"Q. 'Vould you want to run it? 
"A. No." 
Mr. Hone testified that the highest and best use 
of the 'Vest property was a truck stop and service 
station site and that the market value at the time of 
the taking was from $25,000.00 to $30,000.00 ( T-23-
24). 
Earl Peterson was called as an expert witness and 
testified that he was a real estate appraiser and owner 
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of the Real Estate Exchange located in Ogden, Utah 
( T-32-33). He testified that the highest and best use 
of the East property was a service station and store 
site and that the market value at the time of the taking 
was $35,000.00 ( T-34) . He further testified that the 
market value of the East property after the taking 
was nominal ( T-34) . 
~Ir. Peterson testified that the highest and best 
use of the 'Vest property was a service station or truck 
stop and that the market value at the time of the taking 
was $40,000.00 (T-33). 
Mr. Earl Jones was called as an expert witness 
and testified that he was the owner of Blackburn & 
Jones Company dealing in real estate and insurance 
and that he had been appraising property in Ogden for 
21 years ( T-38-39). He testified that the highest and 
best use of the East property was a service station 
and store site and that the market value at the time of 
the taking was $40,000.00 ( T-40) . He testified that the 
value of the East property after the taking was nominal 
( T -40) . As a basis for his opinion he had a list of 42 
sales of service station sites in the area during the pre-
vious six years ( T-44 ) . 
Mr. Jones further testified that the highest and 
best use of the West property was a service station site 
and that the market value at the time of the taking 
was $35,000.00 (T-39). 
Mrs. Irene Kendell was called as a witness and as 
a part-owner of the subject property. She testified that 
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the East property at the time of the taking was worth 
from $60,000 to $7 5,000 ( T-58) . She testified that 
the market value of the \Vest property at the time of 
the taking was from $30,000 to $40,000 ( T-57) . 
It seems clear that the verdict of the jury was well 
within the evidence introduced at the trial. Under the 
Ctah eases and the evidence it seems obvious that the 
verdict was not against the weight of the evidence and 
was not the result of passion or prejudice. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
~OT GIVING AN INSTRUCTION PERTAIN-
ING TO THE RIGHT OF AN OlVNER OF 
PRIVATE PROPERTY TO HAVE A PUBLIC 
THOROUGHFARE ADJACENT TO HIS 
PROPERTY. 
It should be noted that appellant's argument on 
this point has no bearing on the \Vest property since 
the 2.89 acres taken abutted Highway 89 at the time 
of the taking and subsequent improvements had no 
bearing on this parcel since it was completely taken. 
Appellant's argument under Point II goes to the 
damages sustained by the East property which was left 
in respondents' ownership after appellant's improve-
ments. It should be noted at this point that respondents 
are not contending that the State did not have the 
right to move Higlnrny ao slightly to the south of 
respondents' property but are asserting that the fenc-
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ing off of respondents' property, causing a loss of access 
and the damages caused by the taking of the piece of 
property east of the Highway 89 right-of-way, are 
compensable damages under the Utah law. Ergo, ap-
pellant's contention on this point has little, if any, ma-
teriality and persuasive effect in the matter. 
Appellant made no request to the trial court for 
the instruction referred to in its argument ( R-28A). 
In cases where parties have failed to request particular 
instructions the Utah Court has ref used to find error 
on the part of the trial court. 
In the case of Salt Lake & U.R. Co. v. Schramm, 
56 Utah 53, 189 P. 90, the Utah Supreme Court made 
the following observation at page 92 of the opinion: 
"If the plaintiff desired more specific instruc-
tions than given by the court, it became the 
duty of the plaintiff to frame and present them 
for the court's consideration. This the plaintiff 
did not do ... Not having made a written request 
to the court to charge the jury in the particulars 
complained of, the court's failure to do so will 
not be regarded as error." 
In Taylor v. Los Angeles & S.L.R. Co., 61 Utah 
524, 216 P. 239, the Utah Court made the following 
observation at page 242 of the opinion and thereafter 
listed numerous authorities in support thereof: 
"It is generally held that error cannot be based 
on the failure to· give a particular instruction 
when no request therefor is made . " 
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In State v. Valdez, 432 P.2d 53, decided by this 
court on September 29, 1967, where the defendant 
made no written or oral request for an instruction on 
an included offense, and where this court agreed that 
the defendant was entitled to such an instruction if 
he had so desired, the court held that there was no 
prejudicial error for failure of the trial court to give 
such instruction in the absence of a request therefor. 
At page 54 of the opinion, Justice Crockett made the 
following observation: 
.. If the defendant had desired that procedure, 
it was his duty to submit a proper request in 
writing, or at least to clearly indicate to the 
court orally that such was his desire." 
And further, at page 55: 
"Although the record does show oral exception 
to the instructions relating to consideration of 
the evidence concerning motive and prior con-
victions of felony, the grounds now complained 
of were not mentioned. The purpose of excep-
tions is to assist the court in giving correct 
instructions. This purpose is best served by call-
ing its attention to what is wrong and suggesting 
what is right. But the purpose of this procedure 
is not to permit a party to take an exception 
upon one ground, and then if he is convicted, 
use a different ground than he disclosed to the 
court to obtain a reversal. Accordingly, if the 
defendant has not stated a correct basis for 
objection to an instruction, he cannot wait until 
after he loses, and then complain about it for 
the first time." 
It should be noted in the instant case before this 
court that appellant neither requested the instruction 
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it alleges should have been given or took an exceptiou 
to the court's instructions pertaining to the point raised 
in its argument on appeal (R-28A, T-101). 
}'or cases with similar holdings to the Valdez case 
see State v. McNaughton, 92 Utah 99, 58 P.2d 5, and 
State v. Yee Foo Lun, 45 Utah 531, 147 P. 488. 
Appellant cites the case of Robinette v. Price, 7 4 
Utah 512, 280 P. 736, which involved the closing of a 
portion of a street in Price, Utah. The court framed 
the issue of the appeal as whether or not the appellant 
had shown such a special interest in the portion of the 
street closed and discontinued as to entitle him to com-
pensation. The court found that the appellant had "as 
ready ingress and egress" to his property as he had 
prior to the closing of the portion of the street. The 
court used the following language at pages 736-7 of 
the opinion: 
"Tenth Street running south from the high-
way on which the north boundary of plaintiff's 
parcel abuts was not closed or discontinued. It 
is alleged in the complaint that the closing of 
the portion of 10th Street which was closed pre-
vented ingress and egress to and from plain· 
tiff's property. But such claim is not supported 
by the evidence. The evidence, without dispute, 
shows that the highway on which plaintiff's par-
cel abutted affords him as ready ingress and 
egress (emphasis added) to and from the north 
boundarv of his land as it did before the portion 
of 10th Street was closed and discontinued, and 
that the south portion of his parcel was not dis-
turbed or interfered with in any particular." 
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This case hardly fits the Kendell case where a por-
tion of the East property was actually taken which 
makes the Kendell case a proper subject of severance 
damages and also an almost complete loss of access 
by the fencing in of the Kendell property reducing a 
rnluable commercial site to a tract of property of 
nominal value. 
Appellant relies heavily on Springville Bankiny 
('ompan,1; v. Burton, 10 Utah 2d 100, 349 P.2d 157, 
where a concrete island in the middle of Main Street 
in SpringYille was constructed eliminating U turns and 
left tur11s. The court held that this was not compensable 
under C tah law. The primary concern of the court was 
the fact that if the State had to pay for loss of access 
to abutting property owners every time an island was 
placed i11 a through highway, the expense would be pro-
hibitive. This case, however, is not controlling in the 
Kendell case since even though islands were placed in 
the through highway in front of the Kendell property, 
such construction was never claimed at the trial as a 
basis for damages to the Kendells. The fencing off 
of a senice station and store site and the actual taking 
of a portion of such property for State purposes is 
hardly analagous with a case involving the mere con-
struction of an island in the middle of a highway. 
The measure of damages in an eminent domain 
proceeding is based on the provisions of 78-34-10, Utah 
Code Annotated, 19.53, and Article I, § 22 of the Con-
stitution of Utah which provides as follows: 
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"Private property shall not be taken or dam-
aged for public use without just compensation." 
The following authorities are cited for the propo-
sition that the Kendell family \Vas properly awarded 
damages in the case at bar under Utah law, general 
law, and sound reason based upon balancing the equi-
ties of the public and the private land owner. 
In the case of DoollJ Block v. Salt Lake Rapid 
Transit Company, 9 Utah 31, 33 P. 229, where the 
respondents were owners of certain lots situated on 2nd 
South Street in Salt Lake City, and where appellants 
were trying to install railroad tracks, telephone lines 
and wires along the street which would have interfered 
with respondents' access to their respective properties; 
the Court found that the respondents "are the owners 
of equitable easements in fee of rights of access, ingress, 
and egress to their respective lots in front thereof in 
the street, and entitled to the free and unobstructed 
use of that portion of said street as a means of access, 
... " The Court went on to say that the right of access, 
light and air constitute the principal values of such 
property and that "such privileges are easements in fee, 
-incorporeal hereditaments,-and form a part of the 
estate in the lots." The Court further indicated that 
these rights "are appurtenances to the land which can-
not be so embarrassed or abridged as to materially inter-
fere with its proper use and enjoyment, and they are, 
in effect, property of which the owners cannot be de-
prived without due compensation." 
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The similarity of the Dooly case and the instant 
ease is close since .l\lr. and .Mrs. Kendell had exercised 
their easement of access from U. S. Highway 89 and 
U. S. Highway 30 since 1940. The Kendell case is sub-
stantially stronger since they had business property 
of a nature and type that used the access easement many 
times a day. 
In State v. Fourth District Court, et al., 94 Utah 
384, 78 P.2d 502, where plaintiffs were owners of lots 
abutti11g Center Street in Provo City and defendants 
were proceeding to construct a viaduct on said street 
which would have raised the grade of the street in 
front of plaintiffs' properties and would have affected 
their access, the Court held (page 510 of the opinion) 
that if such constructio11 constituted either a taking or 
a damaging of the property of the abutting landowners, 
then steps should be taken for proper compensation 
therefor. 
In the leading Utah case of Utah Road Commis-
sion v. Hansen, H Utah 2d 305, 383 P.2d 917, where 
the State was taking 1.84 acres of an 18.06 acre tract 
of defendant's land located on the north side of 21st 
South Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, which property 
was used for def enda11t' s auto wrecking business, and 
where a jury had awarded defendant $21,500.00 for 
the land taken and $3,-t.00.00 as se\'erance damages to 
the remaining land, the Court cited the Dooly Block 
'l'. S(/lt L(/kc R(/pid 1'rruzsit Company case with ap-
prornl and reaffirmed its position that an established 
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easement of access by an abutting property owner is 
compensable under a condemnation proceeding. The 
Court further ruled in the Han sen case that an ease-
ment of access that was appurtenant to the property 
taken was a proper element of damages and that a;1 
existing easement to the remaining land not taken was 
compensable. The Court at page 920 defined an ease-
ment as follows: 
" ... an easement of access contemplates a 
travelled way from the property to the highway." 
It should be noted that the Hans en case is a 1963 
case and is subsequent to the cases cited by appellant 
in its brief. It should further be noted that the Kendell 
situation fits the provisions of the Han.sen case in that 
they had an easement of access from the two highways 
to their store and service station property since 1940. 
The Kendell case is stronger than the Hansen 
case since part of the East property was actually taken 
necessitating the removal of a complete section of gas 
pumps in addition to the damages for loss of access. 
In Jacobsen v. Incorporated Village of Russell 
Gardens, 201 N.Y.S. 2d 183, the New York Court held 
that the city had no right to remove the curb and erect 
barriers at the curb line which would block plaintiff's 
easement of access to the public street without com-
pensation therefor. 
In Brownlow v. O' Donoghue Brothers, 276 F. 
636, 22 ALR 939, (District of Columbia Court of Ap-
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peals), where the defendants owned a service station 
with two entrances to the property on Irving Street 
and one entrance on 14th Street, and where the com-
missioners of the District of Columbia proposed to 
close the 14th Street entrance and compel defendants 
to use only the Irving Street entrance, the Court held 
that defendants were entitled to have ingress and egress 
from their property oB both streets and based its deci-
sion on the grounds that it was obvious than an entrance 
to a place of business such as defendants' business from 
a street over which there was much travel is far more 
rnluable than one from a street where the traffic is 
light. The court said at page 941: 
" 'For example, an abutting owner's right of 
access to and from the street, subject only to 
legitimate public regulation, is as much his prop-
erty as his right to the soil within his boundary 
lines. . . . 'Vhen he is deprived of such right 
of access or of any other easement connected 
with the use and ~njoyment of his property, 
other than by the exercise of legitimate public 
regulation he is deprived of his property. 
" 'It was further seen that he had certain 
rights not shared by the public at large, special 
and peculiar to himself. and which arose out 
of the very relation of his lot to the street in 
front of it; ... and that these rights, whether 
the bare fee of the streets was in the lot owner 
or in the citv, were rights of property, and as 
such ought t~ be and were as sacred from legis-
lative invasion as his right to the lot itself." 
In 73 ALR 2d 652, at pagei 6.f6-7, it is stated as 
follows: 
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. "The overwhelming weight of aut~ority recog-
mzes as a statement of general prmciple, that 
the right of access to and from a public high-
way is one of the incidents of ownership or occu. 
pancy of land abutting thereon, of which the 
owner cannot be deprived without compensation, 
whether the fee to the way is in the public or the 
abutter. 
"YVhen cases throughout the annotation are 
analyzed, it will become apparent that most of 
them involve the complaints of businesses, not-
ably gasoline stations, which require _generous 
access (emphasis added) for a profitable opera· 
tion." , 
In 43 ALR 2d 1072, which is an annotation relat· 
ing to an abutting owner's right to damages for loss of 
access because of the installation of a limited- access 
highway, the following observation is made at page 
1074: 
"'Vhere an established 'land-service road' in ' 
which the normal right of access had already 
come into being, is converted into a limited-ac-
cess way in such a manner that the existing 
rights of access are destroyed, the owners of 1 
such rights are entitled to compensation, exactly 
as they would be if such rights were destroyed 
by any other type of construction." 
And further, at page 1077: 
"A difficult problem is presented when, be-
cause of the conversion of an ordinary highway 
into a limited-access way, the right of direct 
access is destroyed but there is available a means 
of indir~ct access either by other existing streets 
or by the construction of service or feeder roads 
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upon which the abutting landowner can move 
from his property to one of the authorized entrys 
to the limited-access roadway. 
"The cases luwe apparently recognized that 
the landowner is entitled to compensation where 
his direct right of access is taken, even though 
other but less satisfactorv, means of access are 
available." · 
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CONCLUSION 
It seems clear in the subject case that the jury 
awarded respondents what they felt was the market 
value of the \Vest property at the time of the taking 
based upon the highest and best use as testified by 
respondents' expert witnesses. It is further evident that 
the jury, in awarding damages to the East property, 
considered the loss of the portion of the East property 
which necessitated the removal of a section of gas 
pumps, and further considered the loss of the easement 
of access which had existed since 1940 because of the 
fence installation. The jury obviously felt that the 
feeder road constructed by the State, with its entrance 
located 827 feet to the north of the subject property, 
was not sufficient and reasonable access for service 
station and store use. The verdict of the jury was well 
within the evidence and the verdict of the jury and 
the judgment entered thereon by the trial court should 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FROERER, HOROWITZ, PARKER, 
RICHARDS, THORNLEY & CRITCHLO'V 
Richard H. Thornley 
Attorneys for Respondents 
200 Kiesel Building 
Ogden, Utah 
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